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HEAD-UP TRANSITION BEHAVIOR OF PILOTS DURING SIMULATED
LOW-VISIBILITY APPROACHES
Richard F. Haines
Ames Research Center
SUMMARY
Each of 13 commercial pilots from four airlines flew a total of 108 manual flight director
approaches in a moving base simulation of a medium-sized turbojet (95,000-1b gross weight) which
had a day and night Redifon external scene. Three levels of RVR (1,600; 2,400; and 8,000 ft), three
wind-shear profiles, nine ceiling heights, and continuous and intermittent visibility after initial
breakout were tested. The time required for the captain to evaluate the runway visual environment
after looking up from the instrument panel following a descent below clouds, the number of head-
up transitions from instrument reference, and various subjective ratings of the controllability and
precision of control were obtained on every approach. The results indicated that: (1) mean decision
time ranged from 2 to 4.6 sec for ceilings under 380 ft across the three RVR conditions (p _<0.001);
(2) mean vertical distance traveled during the visual-cue assessment period was a relatively cofistant
proportion below the existing ceiling; (3) a significant three-way interaction in mean decision time
between wind shear, day-night, and ceiling-RVR variables occurred (p _<0.05); (4) mean number of
head-up transitions to VFR conditions after breakout ranged from 4.6 to 13.4 and increased as a
function of ceiling (p _<0.001) and severity of wind shear (p _< 0.01) (the lower visibility conditions
after breakout produced a less consistent relationship); the typical duration of fixation out the
window was 1.5 sec; and (5) subjective pilot ratings of controllability and precision of control as
well as amount of skill, attention, or effort required to make the landing were influenced signifi-
cantly by the wind shear, night conditions, and low breakout ceiling conditions.
INTRODUCTION
The Head-up Transition
A pilot's transition from instrument reference to visual reference during a landing approach
involves two separate but interrelated behaviors: (1) physical movement of the head and eyes
(including refocus of the lenses of the eyes) and (2) cognitive processes involved in switching one's
perceptual frame of reference from one set of cues to another. (The interested reader is referred to
a laboratory study by Fischer (ref. 1) and to the many references cited therein for further informa-
tion about cognitive switching between two superimposed information sets.) Although some work
has been done to quantify the first type of behavior (refs. 2, 3), few have tried to quantify the
time required for the perceptual switch. As will be discussed, both practical and conceptual diffi-
culties seem to have inhibited previous investigators from pursuing research on this matter.
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to the moment when he looks up and out the windshield. At that point, the amount of instrument-
derived information falls off rapidly. Frequently, the reason that the pilot flying on instruments
looks up is because the second pilot, who has been looking outside for another set of necessary and
sufficient external ground cues, eventually reaches the point where he calls out "runway in sight"
or some other appropriate phrase.
This cockpit procedure is used by numerous commercial air carriers; by implication, it is
assumed that when the pilot flying looks up he also should be able to see (within a short period of
time) what the second pilot sees. The approximate manner by which this outside scene reference
information increases is shown by the dashed line in figure 1. The homogeneity or nonhomogeneity
of the particles (e.g., fog, rain) along the line of sight of the pilot to the ground and the nature of
the runway environment's conspicuity combine to influence the exact form of this dashed line.
(The term conspicuity is used to refer to all aspects of the runway environment that combine to
yield an initial visual detection of its presence and subsequent perceptual integration of those cues
that provide runway alignment, roll, range, vertical rate, and other landing information. As is dis-
cussed in detail elsewhere (ref. 7), the conspicuity of luminous sources, such as runway lights and
reflective runway markings, differs over a wide range depending on numerous factors, not least of
which is the pilot's own state of light adaptation.) The dashed line shown in figure 1 is based on the
assumption of a homogeneous light-extinction coefficient (refs. 8-10).
Of course, extremely dense patches of fog can produce very rapid changes in the amount of
outside scene reference information; as a result, by the time the second pilot detects and identifies
some feature of the runway environment and then calls it out to the pilot flying head-down it may
disappear again by the time the latter pilot looks up. In such circumstances, the question must be
asked what the pilot flying does then. Does he stay head-up, expecting the required ground cues to
reappear imminently, or does he look back to the instrument panel?
For the type of visual-range reduction portrayed in figure 1, there exists a "potential informa-
tion gap" (shaded region); it results from the fact that although the pilot flying may be looking
outside, he has not yet had enough time to assimilate the available cues into a consistent, or at least
perceptually useful, pattern. Thus, a part of this delay is probably a result of optical factors external
to the pilot; another part is a result of perceptual factors that introduce a delay in detecting or
interpreting the available visual information. At the point the dashed line crosses the horizontal
line (fig. 1) labeled "necessary amount" of information, the pilot has successfully organized his per-
ception of the runway scene into a functionally useful array of information that permits him to
decide to complete the landing approach or to execute a missed approach. It is the determination of
the time duration t and the number of head-up transitions made that is of primary concern in the
present investigation.
Of course, the duration of t could become a contributory factor in an incident or accident
under some flight conditions. One such condition is illustrated in the top diagram of figure 1. The
pilot may assume that the aircraft is both on the correct flightpath and in trim so that it will follow
a ballistic trajectory during time period t. (Actually, aircraft trim holds airspeed constant (more
accurately angle of attack) rather than a given trajectory in no-wind conditions.) In addition, track
errors will normally stay within acceptable limits only for a few seconds, because of usual atmo-
spheric disturbances. Finally, a vector error can arise during the transition period that may go
unnoticed by the pilot who is (at this time) attempting to integrate a highly dynamic set of visual
cues (ref. 5). This is particularly true in conditions in which the ground is obscured beyond the
pilot's aim point. Thus, slight-pitch-attitude changes caused by atmospheric disturbances may not
be perceived at all or not in time to effect corrective input. The result could be an undesirable
change in flightpath that could result in an accident or an incident.
Another situation that can lead to a deliberate control input by the pilot during this critical
head-up transition arises as a result of certain ambiguous, illusory conditions. As Jenny, Malone, and
Schweickert (ref. 11) have stated, "One visual illusion usually associated with fog conditions is the
pitch-up illusion where the pilot suddenly loses his visual field of view due to the rapid onset of fog.
The pilot's past experience leads him to conclude that such a rapid loss of the visual segment means
that he has inadvertently pitched the aircraft up. To correct this he then pitches down." Other
examples of inappropriate control responses could be given to emphasize the often critical nature of
period t.
Previous Research Findings on Head-up Transition Time
As mentioned above, the head-up transition involves two separate components, one physical,
the other cognitive. Few investigators have attempted to separate the two types of behavior. In the
brief review that follows, an attempt is made to group the available studies into these two categories
based on details given in the original reports.
Physical transition time- According to work reported by Quilley (ref. 2), the period required
for a pilot to make the transition from visual to instrument reference on takeoff is typically about
1 sec. Quilley suggests that this short period of time is probably due to the fact that: (1) the aircraft
is progressing into a phase of flight where there is greater tolerance for minor perceptual errors that
do occur because of a continuing build-up of takeoff energy over a minimum level, (2) the aircraft
is gaining altitude and there is an increasing margin of needed separation distance with the ground,
and (3) the crew members are likely to be less fatigued than during a landing.
The transition from instrument to visual reference during an approach may take substantially
longer than 1 sec. Quoting the findings of the U.S. Air Force Flight Dynamics Laboratory, Wright-
Patterson AFB and other groups, DeCelles (ref. 12) cites transition durations as long as 5 sec.
Unfortunately, the exact basis on which these values are presented is not given; the present investi-
gation was intended to address this issue.
Some insight may be gained on this matter from a study of pilot eye scan during simulated
night approaches conducted by Langley Research Center using Piedmont Airline's FAA certified
727 simulator at Winston-Salem, North Carolina (ref. 13). Two of the responses monitored were
the number of head-up transitions (from the instrument panel) to the computer-generated external
scene and the dwell time during these looks outside. Unfortunately, no attempt was made to have
the pilot signify, after having looked up, when he felt he had sufficient visual cues with which to
make his decision to continue the approach or to execute a missed approach. Nevertheless, it is
instructive to briefly review some of the data collected. Considering only nighttime conditions and
manual approaches under VFR conditions without wind shear, the eight commercial pilots looked
up (out the window) from the instrument panel (transitioned) an average of 4.8 times (with a mean
dwell time of 0.8 sec) for the 1,000- to 500-ft altitude segment of the approach. For the 500- to
200-ft altitude segment they transitioned an average of 4.6 times with a mean dwell time of 0.8 sec.
For the 200- to 20-ft altitude segment they transitioned an average of 3 times with a mean dwell
time of 1.4 sec. The use of such long data-analysis flight segments makes it impossible to deduce the
time required to transition up or down. It may be pointed out, however, that if one assumes that
these pilots flew along a 3° glide slope at 135 knots, the 1,000-ft to 500-ft altitude segment would
require 41.8-sec transit time. These mean data showed that the pilot was head-up a total of 3.8 sec
(10.1%) of this duration. The theoretical transit time for the 500- to 200-ft altitude segment would
be 25.1 sec with the pilot remaining head-up a total of 2.7 sec (17.2%) of this duration. The
theoretical transit time for the 200- to 20-ft altitude segment would be 15.1 sec with the pilot
remaining head-up a total of 4.2 sec (38.6%) of this duration. Presumably, the pilot stayed head-up
during the remainder of the 1.6 sec to (theoretical) touchdown.
The above head-up mean durations provide a clue to the adequacy, as judged by the pilots
tested, of the visual information seen outside the cockpit. The progressively longer periods of time
the pilot stays head-up during a typical VFR approach strongly suggest that he is in the process of
progressively emphasizing the judged usefulness of the available external guidance and control cues
and progressively deemphasizing the judged usefulness of on-board information.
Cognitive transition time- The amount of time required to acquire the necessary guidance and
control information from the external scene is integrally related to the length of the transition time
under discussion. Brown (ref. 3) reported that for night Category II conditions in a simu-
lator, his subject pilots required about 2 sec to assess the landing conditions and to make a decision
to land if the pilot in control was doing nothing else. He found that a decision time of 3 sec was a
more general (representative) duration from the 500 approaches conducted in his study. Also, he
reported that pilots took almost twice as long to assess the visual situation at an altitude of 200 ft
than at an altitude of 150 ft or 100 ft, under normal circumstances; however, visual contact time
before reaching decision height was found to have little influence on the pilot's decision to land or
to execute a missed approach.
Helmore and Shaw (ref. 14) conducted a landing study under Category III conditions in a
simulator and also reported evidence that exposure time was not a critical factor in the pilot's
decision to land or go around. They also stated that an expansion of the visual segment could lead
to a decision to land in less than 1 sec, whereas if no expansion of the visual segment was perceived
within a 2-sec period, a missed approach was far more likely to be executed. Interestingly, these
investigators found no clear-cut relationship between the size of the visual segment at decision
height (DH) and the decision to land or go around. On the other hand, they found that their pilots
required at least 1 sec of an expanding visual segment in order to lead them to decide to land.
Helmore and Shaw used a "monitored approach" cockpit procedure in which the First Officer
flew the aircraft down to the decision height while the Captain monitored the approach. If, in the
opinion of the Captain, sufficient visual cues were present from the external scene at DH he would
take command and land the aircraft. These investigators also used a triplex autopilot. Use of either
the monitored-approach procedure, the autopilot, or both may have reduced the quantity or quality
of external visual cues deemed necessary by the pilot flying to decide to continue the approach as
compared with a fully manual landing.
The Present Study
The present study is concerned with the physical and the cognitive aspects of the head-up
transition of pilots during conventional instrument flight. Included here are both the duration of
the entire decisionmaking process after looking outside as well as the frequency of these head-up
transitions under various environmental conditions.
This investigation was conducted as part of the joint FAA/NASA Head-up Display Concept
Evaluation Project, Task Order DOT-FA77WAI-725 to Interagency Agreement NASA-
NMI 1052.151, dated March 9, 1977. A detailed program plan is presented elsewhere (ref. 15). The
present investigation constituted a subtask of Phase 2 work on perceptual and human factors related
to the HUD concept and was conducted before a HUD was available for testing.
I wish to thank Barry Scott, Donna Miller, Dick Pocius, Kathleen Bird, and Rick Linares for
valuable assistance provided during the conduct of this study and to the staff of the Simulation
Sciences Division for their cooperative support.
METHOD
Pilot Subjects
The subjects of this study were 13 commercial airline pilots. Table 1 presents information
about the test subjects.
TABLE 1.-SUBJECT PILOT INFORMATION
Seat Aircraft Cat. II rated/ Est. landings
Pilot Age Airline Hoursflown type aircraft Cat. I Cat. II
A 45 A Capt. B707 3800 Yes/707 33 0
B 47 A F/O B707 1200 Yes/707 9 0
C 59 A Capt. B747 3780 Yes/707 9 6
D 42 A Capt. B707 1500 Yes/707 17 3
E 41 B F/O L1011 45 No 3 0
F 37 B F/O B707 600 Yes/707 _a ?a
G 49 B Capt. B707 6894 Yes/707 9 2
H 33 B F/O L1011 63 No 0 0
I 36 B F/O L1011 180 No 12 0
J 42 C 2nd/O B727 2700 No 0 0
K 41 C 2nd/O B727 1860 No 4 0
L 42 C F/O B727 6000 Yes/727 0 0
M 41 C F/O DC-8 5230 Yes/DC-8 0 2
apilot was unsure of the answer.
All subjects were paid for their services. A battery of vision examinations and an attitude and
information survey were administered to each subject prior to testing. A copy of the attitude and
information questionnaire is provided in appendix A. All subjects possessed 20:20 or better distance
acuity, full and normal peripheral visual sensitivity, normal ocular motility, and no color
deficiencies.
Experimental Design
A diagram of the experimental design is presented in appendix B. The investigation
may be characterized as two separate randomized blocks studies. For one of these studies the pilot
was presented with a continuous view of the runway environment after descending below a cloud
ceiling (labeled "visibility continuous" and shown at the top half Of appendix B). In the second
study visual slant range was reduced to zero rapidly at an unexpected time, once the pilot flying
had looked up from the instrument panel after descending below a given cloud ceiling (labeled
"visibility intermittent" and shown at the bottom-half of appendix B). A randomly selected delay,
progx:ammed by the computer, ranging from 1.5 to 4 sec, caused the reduction in slant range.
Each subject underwent the combination of conditions indicated by black dots in appendix B
for a total of 46 visibility-continuous runs and24 visibility-intermittent runs. The 35-day and
35-night conditions were presented in random order. As mentioned in the test instructions (appen-
dix C), the pilots were provided information about tower-reported wind and RVR conditions before
each run. A 200-ft decision height applied to the RVR 2,400 condition and a 150-ft decision height
to the RVR 1,600 condition. These two weather conditions were referred to as Categories I
and IIA, respectively.
Apparatus
Testing was conducted in a three degree-of-freedom simulator (fig. 2) at Ames Research Center
with the motion characteristics given in appendix D. A medium-sized turbojet transport was simu-
lated by a Sigma 7 digital computer driving an 8400 computer. The external scene was generated
by a Redifon model board (900:1 scale), collimating lens, and other equipment described in detail
elsewhere (ref. 16). The runway environment consisted of approach strobes, runway centerline,
edge lights and markings representative of a Category II runway. A model without runway cen-
terline, edge or approach lights was used in daytime runs; a different model, with runway, edge, and
approach lights was used in the nighttime runs. The reduced visibility conditions were produced by
electronic means, namely, video mixing a white line raster with the color scene to adjust the visual
contrast of the display to a distance equivalent to the required RVR.
Figure 2.- Photograph of motion-base simulator used.
An instrument panel typical of a medium-sized turbojet aircraft was used only on the left side
of the panel. The usual engine gauges were operational in the center console. A Sperry "Horizon
Flight Director Indicator" model HZ-6B was used. Normal reference airspeed was 124 knots with
40 ° flaps and engine set to 72% power.
Figure 3 shows the interior of the cockpit. An experimenter sat behind the left seat, viewing
the pilot's facial region and eye movements through an infrared viewer (by means of a mirror) under
all ambient illumination conditions. A reference eye-position device was installed in order to pre-
cisely locate the pilot's head prior to testing. This device can be seen in figure 3 on each side of the
forward window directly in front of the pilot; it consisted of a single light source located within a
light-tight box (directly above the window) with a right-hand and left-hand fiber bundle extending
downward on each side of the window to an aperture. The shape and aiming direction of the exit
P
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Figure 3.- Photograph of simulator interior.
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end of each optic bundle were such that both lights could be seen only when the pilot's eyes were in
the correct position in space (+ 1 cm laterally and vertically; +2 cm longitudinally).
Several wind shears were included in order to increase the pilot's workload during these man-
ual ILS approaches. A no-wind control condition was included under all of the other testing condi-
tions as was a 25-knot headwind at starting altitude (1,040 ft) decreasing exponentially to 0 knots
at the runway (shear no. 25). Shear nos. 7 and 9 both had a 15-knot tower-reported headwind.
Shear no. 7 had a 30-knot headwind at starting altitude down to 400 ft; this headwind dropped to
18 knots at 300 ft, followed by an exponential decay to 15 knots at the runway. Shear no. 9 had a
30-knot headwind from starting altitude down to 150 ft, which changed to 18 knots at 50 ft, fol-
lowed by an exponential decay to 15 knots at the runway. Shear no. 22 had an 8-knot tower-
reported tailwind; this shear had a 25-knot tailwind at 500 ft, which dropped to 10 knots at 350 ft,
and was followed by an exponential decay to an 8-knot tailwind at the runway.
Procedures
The activites of the subject pilots may be described in three stages: pretesting, familiarization
runs, and data runs. The pretesting consisted of vision tests and the completion of a questionnaire
(see appendix A). From 10 to 15 familiarization runs were given to each subject pilot to help him
become accustomed to the handling qualities of the simulator (aircraft model), the required cockpit
procedures, and the general nature of the cockpit layout and external scene and its variations. From
one to four warm-up runs were given on each testing day. Each subject had to return to Ames
Research Center for several days to complete the data collection.
The pilot was instructed to request information over the intercom concerning prevailing
weather conditions at the start of each run. An experimenter recited a standard weather briefing
that corresponded to the test conditions for that run. This briefing included wind direction and
velocity, ceiling, RVR, and the possibility of encountering wind shear. In no case was any specific
information given regarding the shear profile; rather, the pilot was told "the aircraft that just landed
reported a wind shear on final." This procedure not only added to the realism of the test environ-
ment but also helped ensure that the subject pilots knew approximately what to expect concerning
the environmental variables on each run.
Since the Captain (pilot flying) and First Officer were always selected from the same airline,
they were instructed to use their company procedures concerning minimum altitude (and other
cockpit) call-outs, and operating procedures.
For each run the Captain was instructed to remain head-down, using the ILS glide slope and
localizer bars and flight director for his primary guidance (and employing his normal eye scan
behavior). The First Officer was instructed to remain head-up as much of the time as possible. He
was also supposed to look at the instrument panel for all required instrument cross-check informa-
tion and at the external scene for the required ground environmental cues. The pilot flying was also
told to look up from his instruments as soon as practical after the First Officer said he had seen the
previously agreed upon ground environmental cues (e.g., runway, approach lights). The First Officer
pressed a response button as he said this. The pilot flying did not have to continue looking outside
but could return to instrument reference as soon and as often as he liked. He was also instructed to
say "decision" or "decision made" at that point in the approach (while he was looking outside)
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when he felt he had acquired sufficient visual information to decide whether to continue the
approach or to execute a missed approach.
Some clarification of cockpit procedures was needed for the present study because not all air-
lines use the same procedures and because different cockpit equipment was used by different pilots.
These clarifications included, but were not necessarily limited to, the following:
1. Definition of what constituted necessary and sufficient runway environmental cues at
decision height.
2. Discussion of the procedures required to execute a missed approach.
3. Clarification of the correct interpretation of the flight director bars (when different from
those already familiar with).
4. Clarification of required scan behavior of the pilots relative to the instruments.
5. Demonstration of the seat adjustment procedures to attain the correct reference eye
position.
6. Discussion of the approach and landing Checklist reading procedures.
At no time were the subject pilots told that their eye movements were being monitored. How-
ever, they were told that all speech was being recorded.
In order to help increase realism and workload, an abbreviated approach and landing checklist
was used on every approach (appendix E). The pilot flying was supposed to ask the First Officer to
read the checklist. This checklist took about 25 sec to complete.
Immediately after each run had finished, the experimenter (who sat in a jump seat behind the
Captain) asked each crew member to rate the run on a numeric scale from 1 to 10 (see appendix F)
with regard to: (1) the controllability and precision of control of the approach, and (2) the
demands on the skill, attention, and effort of the pilot. The five "verbal anchor points" shown on
each scale were adapted from Jex (ref. 17) who based the scale on earlier work by McDonnell
(ref. 18). These interval scales permit averaging as well as other standard parametric statistical
analyses. As Jex points out, "Use of two trait categories, task controllability-and-precision and dis-
play attentional workload, should permit separation of these often-confounded effects."
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Several head-up transition performance measures, subject pilot ratings of the controllability
and precision of control of the approach, and pilot demands in terms of the degree of skill, atten-
tion, or effort required were quantified.
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Mean Decision Time Results
Table 2 presents the mean decision time t for each experimental variable investigated. Each
value represents the time between the First Officer's response indicating that he had seen the speci-
fied ground environment and the moment the Captain said "decision." These data were subjected to
analysis of variance (ref. 19). Only data for the continuous visibility test condition are presented
because the analysis of variance required a complete data matrix, i.e., no missing data cells, and
the intermittent visibility condition lead to a relatively large number of missing data cells. A com-
parison between continuous and intermittent visibility test conditions is made below where the
conditions permit such comparisons.
TABLE 2.-CAPTAINS' MEAN DECISION TIMES a
Decision Decision Vertical distanceVariable
height DH, ft time t, sec from DH, ft
1. Ambient illumination
Day --- 2.9 ---
Night --- 3.9 ---
2. Winds
None --- 3.1
Shear 25 --- 3.8 ---
3. RVR ---
8,000 ft None
Ceiling: 615 ft 7.3 ---
Ceiling: 380 ft 4.6 ---
2,400 ft 200
Ceiling: 300 ft 3.5 +61.5
Ceiling: 245 ft 3.5 +6.5
Ceiling: 180 ft 2.3 --45.1
1,600 ft 150
Ceiling: 230 ft 2.6 +51.3
Ceiling: 200 ft 2.7 +20.9
Ceiling: 170 ft 2.0 -2.2
Ceiling: 130 ft 2.2 -44.1
aOnly data for the continuous visibility test condition are shown.
It may be noted that the pilots took 1 sec longer (not significant) on the average to make their
decisions during nighttime approaches than during daytime approaches. The main effect of RVR
ceiling was statistically significant (p _<0.001) (see appendix 6) as was the three-way interaction
between the three main variables (p _<0.05). The 1,600 ft RVR data of table 2 show that mean
decision times ranged from 2 to 2.6 sec, depending on the ceiling. For a 2,400-ft RVR, the range
was from 2.3 to 3.5 sec, and for an 8,000-ft RVR, the range was from 4.6 to 7.3 sec. These data
suggest that these pilots required a minimum of about 2 sec to make the transition from instru-
ment reference to external scene reference, a value close to that cited earlier by Brown (ref. 3). In
addition, an analysis of the data upon which appendix G is based showed that while the wind-shear-
RVR-ceiling interaction was not significant, it was the primary contributor to the significant three-
way interaction. Thus, the contribution of the day-night illumination condition to this interaction
11
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is negligible. Large individual differences also
Mean t, sec Subject Mean t, sec
Subject (across the (across the were found in the duration of t, which rangedpilota pilota
three variables) three variables) from 0.6 to 7.2 sec across these variables as
shown on chart at left.
A 2.2 I 7.2
C 2.9 J .6 The mean decision times given in table 2
E 5.3 K 1.9 were converted into vertical distance traveled,
F 4.2 M 1.9 assuming that the aircraft remained on a 3° glide
H 4.4 slope and maintained 124 knots; the times were
then related to the decision heights that were
asee table 1 for further identification of pilots.
applicable for the 2,400-ft and 1,600 ft RVR
conditions. The positive values in the fight-hand column of table 2 indicate the average number of
of feet above decision height that the Captain's decisions were made; the negative values indicate
the average number of feet below decision height that the decisions were made.
It can be seen that the aircraft descended below decision height in three conditions, all of
which were the lower ceiling conditions. It is perhaps significant that the mean vertical distance
traveled during this period of visual-cue assessment across all nine of the present RVR-ceiling condi-
tions was a relatively constant proportion of the existing ceiling height. Put another way, these
pilots descended about 14% below the existing ceiling altitude (SD = 1.9%) at the time they made
their decision response. Although the meaning of this high degree of consistency is unclear, it may
TABLE 3.- MEAN NUMBER OF suggest that the pilots were integrating relative and not
TIMES CAPTAINS LOOKED UP absolute quantitative and qualitative external visual-
DURING FINAL APPROACHa cue changes. For example, the perceived expansion
pattern of ground-plane details from the pilot's aim
Meannumber point must last for at least 2 to 4 sec, no matter what
Variable of looks the initial altitude is when the aim point first becomes
visible. This finding is in agreement with earlier work
I. Ambient illumination by Helmore and Shaw (ref. 14). Whether this finding
Day 7.4 may be an artifact of the resolution limits that are
Night 7.8 inherent in the present external scene generator
2. Winds remains to be determined.
None 6.7
Shear25 8.4
3. RVR
8,000 ft Mean Number of Head-up Transitions Results
Ceiling:615 ft 13.4
Ceiling: 380 ft 10.8 The number of times each pilot looked up from
2,400 ft the instrument panel after breakout was quantified
Ceiling: 300 ft 7.7 (table 3). These mean data were evaluated by an
Ceiling:245 ft 7.3 analysis of variance; the summary table for the analysis
Ceiling: 180 ft 6.4 is presented in appendix H. Only data for the contin-
1,600 ft uous visibility test conditions are presented here (for
Ceiling: 230 ft 6.3 the same reason as given previously). A comparison
Ceiling: 200ft 6.1 between continuous and intermittent visibility test
Ceiling: 170ft 5.5 conditions is made below, where conditions permit.
Ceiling: 130 ft 4.6
aOnly data for the continuous visibility Although the day-night condition was not staffs-
test conditionareshown, tically significant (7.4 vs 7.8 head-up transitions,
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respectively), the presence of a wind shear produced
Subject Mean Subject Mean significantly more head-up transitions (p _< 0.01) than
pilota lookups pilota lookups did the no-wind condition (8.4 vs 6.7, respectively).
A 5.8 l 7.4 The RVR-ceiling effect also was significant (p _ 0.001 )
C 4.5 J 7.2 with the mean number of transitions ranging from 4.6
E 11.2 K 8.9 for the lowest RVR and ceiling to 13.4 for the highest
F 9.0 M 6.0 RVR and ceiling. As shown on the chart at left, these
H 8.2 data also exhibit relatively large differences from pilot
to pilot.
aSee table 1 for further identification of
pilots. Figures 4 and 5 present these mean data plotted
as functions of ceiling height in order to emphasize the
regular relationship that exists between the no-wind-wind-shear data for the day and nighttime
conditions, respectively. In general, the greater the ceiling the greater the number of head-up-head-
down transitions by the pilot flying, which is not particularly surprising if one assumes that the
flying pilot feels he needs to maintain a continuing cross-check between his instruments and exter-
nal visual cues.
Comparison of these data with combined data for the two lowest segments (i.e., 500 to 20 ft)
of the Piedmont study referred to above (ref. 13) appears reasonable; one of the breakout altitudes
in the present study was 615 ft. For this condition, the present pilots made an average of 10 transi-
tions below an altitude of 615 ft; the pilots in the Piedmont study made 7.6 transitions and the
mean dwell time was 1.1 sec for each transition. When one considers the differences in the external
visual scene used in these two studies, the higher breakout altitude in the present study, and the
other experimental differences, the agreement in these two values is quite good. Similar response
data were also obtained during the Piedmont study for nighttime, Category I, manual approach con-
ditions where the mean number of head-up transitions for the 1,000-500-ft altitude segment was
0.1 and the mean dwell time was 0.3 sec; for the 500-200-ft altitude segment where the mean
DAY
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Figure 4.- Meannumber of times Captain looked up Figure 5.- Meannumber of times Captain looked up
during daytime final approach, during nighttime final approach.
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number of transitions was 0.4 and the dwell time 0.6 sec; and for the 200-20-ft altitude segment
where the mean number of transitions was 2.5 and the dwell time 1.6 sec. Thus, for these two
lowest flight segments, the total number of head-up transitions was 2.9 and the total dwell time was
2.2 sec (per outside look). This compares with a mean of 6.6 head-up transitions for the comparable
conditions in the present study. It is suggested that the greater number of separate looks outside
during the present study occurred because the pilots were presented an external scene with a great
deal more ground-plane detail than was contained in the CGI display used in the Piedmont study. It
should also be mentioned that the 200-ft ceiling used in the Piedmont study would effectively pre-
clude any view of the ground plane above that altitude, thereby discouraging the pilot from looking
outside when at altitudes above 200 ft.
The present study and the Piedmont study have something else in common related to the VFR
conditions. Both studies found that the mean number of head-up transitions decreases with decreas-
ing altitude. For IFR conditions, on the other hand, the mean number of head-up transitions tends
to increase with decreasing altitude. Of course, as altitude and visual slant range continue to
decrease, so does the total available time to assess the external visual scene, so that under IFR
viewing conditions pilots may feel that they require a more frequent information update.
Comparison of Continuous and Intermittent Visibility Mean Results
Twelve day and twelve night test conditions were compared for the continuous and the inter-
mittent visibility conditions. The Captain's mean decision times between the continuous and inter-
mittent visibility condition did not differ significantly for any of the day or night conditions of
RVR ceiling or wind shear. This finding is not unexpected since the decision-time response is deter-
mined by the latest possible point on the approach before the actual control input is made (e.g., to
execute a missed approach) so that the occurrence of the unexpected reduction in visibility should
not affect this response measure. The mean number of head-up transitions was strongly influenced
by whether visibility was continuous or intermittent, however. These results are presented in table 4.
From table 4 it may be noted that there is a large reduction in the number of head-up looks by
the Captain for every intermittent visibility condition compared to the continuous visibility condi-
tion. Since the intermittent visibility condition prevented the pilot from seeing the ground cues
after he looked up the first time, it is understandable that the number of head-up transitions would
drop drastically relative to the continuous-visibility case. Considered from another point of view,
the data suggest that these pilots made a nontrivial number of transitions at relatively low altitudes,
that is, below altitudes represented by the present intermittent conditions.
Relationship Between Mean Decision Time and Landing Performance
An analysis was made of the degree of correlation between the individual pilot data for mean
decision time (table 2) and mean touchdown distance from the runway threshold and vertical rate
at touchdown for each pilot averaged across all runs. No statistically significant correlations were
found, indicating that there was nothing particularly predictive about the mean decision time in
terms of whether the subsequent landing was considered a good one. Another set of similar correla-
tions was made between the individual pilot data for the number of head-up looks (table 3) and
mean touchdown distance and vertical rate at touchdown for each pilot averaged across all runs.
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TABLE 4.-MEAN NUMBER OF HEAD-UP LOOKS BY CAPTAINS
Visibility condition
Variable Daytime,X; SD; N Nighttime, X; SD; N
Continuous Intermittent Continuous Intermittent
Wind: none
RVR 2,400 ft
Ceiling:245 ft 6.0; 3.4; 13 2.9: 0.9; 12 8.2: 3.6; 12 3.5; 2.5; 11
Ceiling: 180ft 5.5;2.3:13 2.3:0.6;13 6.1 :3.0;8 3.1,1.1;10
RVR 1,600 ft
Ceiling:230 ft 5.4; 1.8:13 2.5;0.8; 13 6.8;2.5; 12 2.2; 1.0;9
Ceiling: 170 ft 5.1: 2.0; 12 1.9;0.5; 12 4.6;2.2; 10 2.8; 1.3; 12
Ceiling: 130ft 4.8;2.2:10 2.1:0.9; 11 5.2;2.5;9 2.3; 1.2;8
Wind: shear 25
RVR 2,400 ft
Ceiling:245 ft 8.0;2.9; 12 2.0; 1.1; 12 9.9;4.0; 10 2.0; 0.9;9
Ceiling: 180ft 6.2;2.7;13 2.5;1.1;13 7.1;2.9;9 2.6;1.2;12
RVR 1,600 ft
Ceiling:230 ft 5.8;2.2; 12 1.7;0.8; 13 6.8;2.4;9 2.3; 1.4; 11
Ceiling: 170ft 6.0;2.0:12 2.3;0.7;11 6.0;2.4;8 2.6;0.9;8
Ceiling: 130 ft 4.4;2.2; 11 2.2; 1.1; 13 3.9;2.6;9 2.1;0.7; 11
Wind: shear 9
RVR 2,400 ft
Ceiling:245 ft 7.3:3.2; 13 1.8;0.8; 13 6.3;3.2;9 3.1;1.7; 12
RVR 1,600 ft
Ceiling:230 ft 6.0;2.1; 11 2.3; 1.9; 12 6.3;3.0; 12 2.6;0.5;9
Again, no significant correlations were found. To determine whether the use of mean data across all
of the testing variables may have masked an existing correlation, further correlations were made for
selected RVR-ceiling conditions for the daytime and nighttime runs and for the no-shear and
shear-25 runs. As before, no significant correlations were found. Thus, it appears that landing per-
formance under these testing conditions is not related in any clearly obvious way to the pilot's
mean decision time nor to the number of head-up transitions he makes.
Head-up Transitions in Zero Visibility
The present data were also analyzed for the number of times each pilot looked up from the
instrument panel after he knew that visibility had decreased to zero. It should be noted that the visi-
bility was caused to reduce rapidly to zero and to remain at zero purposely and that this took place
at or near the decision height, since it was of interest to know what pilots would do under such cir-
cumstances. Would they revert immediately to the instrument panel and initiate a missed approach?
Would they continue to look outside expecting to see the runway environment eventually? For the
present analysis the data were converted to percentages of the total possible runs (for each combina-
tion of test conditions shown by a black dot in the bottom part of appendix A) for which one or
more head-up transitions were made after the external scene had disappeared. Table 5 presents these
results. To illustrate how these data are to be interpreted, it can be seen that for the no-shear, day-
time, 2,400-ft RVR, 245-ft ceiling condition, 36% of the approaches made by the 11 pilots who
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TABLE 5.- HEAD-UP LOOKS AFTER VISIBILITY were tested under that condition looked up one
WASREDUCEDTO ZERO or more times after the external scene had
disappeared. Although the great majority of
Pilots who looked up pilots tested looked up only once, pilots A and
oneor moretimes,% K accounted for the remaining instances of two
Variable No wind
shear Shear9 Shear25 separate head-up transitions. The typical dura-tion of each look outside was about 1.5 sec.
Dayli_t The relatively small sample size precludes a
RVR2,400ft meaningful statistical analysis of these data. In
Ceiling: 245 ft 36 (1 l) 17 (12) 30 (10) general, the lower the RVR the larger was the
Ceiling: 180ft 50 (10) --- 33 (9) percentage of pilots who looked up. It is also
RVR 1,600ft important to point out that a 200-ft decision
Ceiling: 230 ft 50 (10) 0 (6) 33 (6) height was used for the RVR 2400 and a 150-ft
Ceiling:170ft 33 (9) --- 45 (i1) decision height for the RVR 1600 conditions.
Ceiling: 130 ft 57 (7) --- 14 (7) Thus, the 180-ft breakout ceiling condition in
Ni_ttime RVR 2400 runs and the 130-ft ceiling conditionRVR 2,400 ft
in RVR 1600 runs represent instances in whichCeiling: 245 ft 20 (10) 14 (7) 14 (7)
these pilots continued the approach below theCeiling: 180 ft 29 (7) --- 44 (9)
RVR 1,600ft designated minimums. These results might be
Ceiling: 230 ft 29 (7) 33 (9) 71 (7) interpreted in several ways. They may suggest
Ceiling: 170 ft 25 (8) --- 43 (7) (1) that these pilots were confident of their
Ceiling: 130ft 40(5) --- 30(10) ability to control the simulator to a landing
without external visual reference, (2) that they
NOTE: Percentages shown are based on the number of felt that the ground would come into sight
pilot subjects shown in parentheses, momentarily if they continued to look outside,
or (3) some combination of the two.
Pilot Rating Results
The pilots were asked to rate the "controllability and precision of control of the approach"
after each run was over. Following this they rated the "amount of skill, attention, or effort
required." Regarding the "controllability" mean ratings, a number of experimental conditions pro-
duced statistically significant differences, namely the shear-no-shear comparisons for all three
RVR-ceiling conditions at the p _< 0.001 level of confidence. (The relatively small number of
significant comparisons out of the total possible led to the decision not to present the mean data for
the subjective ratings. Interested readers may contact the author for these data.) Not surprising was
the fact that the shear runs and the nighttime runs were judged as involving less controllability.
Considering the fact that the mean decision time was about 1 sec longer for the night runs than for
the day runs (table 2) and that the mean number of lookups out the forward window was approxi-
mately the same for the night and day runs (table 3), it is possible that the basis for this pilot
judgment of less controllability during night runs arises from having fewer visual cues available from
the external scene. No clear-cut differences in this subjective rating were found between the contin-
uous and intermittent visibility conditions.
Regarding the mean subjective ratings of "demands on the pilot..." the shear-no-shear com-
parisons produced the most pronounced statistical results, with the shear runs yielding consistently
higher ratings, that is, judged as being more demanding. Also, the night runs yielded higher ratings
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than the day runs, and lower ceiling and RVR conditions yielded higher ratings than did higher
ceilingand largerRVR conditions.
CONCLUSIONS
Perhaps the most general conclusion that can be drawn from these data is that pilots require a
relatively long period of time after looking up from the instrument panel to critically assess avail-
able runway environmental cues. Mean head-up transition-decision times were about 3.5 sec for ceil-
ings of 300 ft or less and RVR of 2,400 ft and 1,600 ft. At an approach speed of 124 knots, this
is equivalent to a distance of 733 ft along the approach path and 38 ft of vertical travel, assuming a
3° glide slope. Evidence was also found suggesting that this visual-cue-assessment process is not alti-
tude dependent per se (for the present set of conditions) but rather breakout ceiling dependent,
which might point to perceptual processing of relative changes of the ground detail more than abso-
lute changes.
The present pilots made from 4 to 14 separate head-up transitions, depending on RVR and
ceiling height. The smallest mean number of transitions was 4.6. If this number of transitions is
made in an actual cockpit by pilots possessing relatively long eye-focus response times (from instru-
ment panel to runway distances), the potential exists for significant visual cue evaluation problems.
These problems, involving poorly focused retinal images, will be compounded by the reduced visual
contrast of ground detail caused by low visibility (e.g., fog) conditions.
These data point to the need for additional studies that involve the use of means for providing
the pilot with guidance and control information superimposed over the external scene, that is, the
head-up display, since the claim has been made that such devices will avoid this critical transition at
low altitudes. The present data can serve as useful comparative baseline data against which later
head-up transition data obtained with head-up displays may be compared.
Ames Research Center
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Moffett Field, California 94035, January 3, 1980
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APPENDIX A
NASA-Ames Research Center llead-up Display
Test Pilot Questionnaire
Note: This study is designed to assess the advantages and disadvantages of the Leave blank
headup display concept for possible use in commercial aviation. All Subj. assigned code:
information you give on this form will be kept confidential and will be Exp. No.: __
summarized statistically. BOT:
EOT:
[Please print all.answers] Vis. Tests:__
Form Compl. i
Name:
Address: zip
Phone (office pref.) [ ] Birthdate:
Do you wear spectacles while flying? yes no (circle)
If you have no military experience skip questions la. - ld.
la. Military Background: Branch
b. Did you receive military pilot training? yes no (circle)
c. List aircraft types in which you trained (if applicable otherwise leave blank):
1st. 2nd
3rd. 4th.
d. List all aviation-related (specialized) training:
(continue on opposite side if necessary)
2. List all pilot associations in which you are now a member:
3. List all airlines and military commands you have ]
ever flown for beginning with the most recent: ]
(Insert in brackets the approximate starting date ]
for each) ].
(continue on opposite side if necessary) ]
]
4a. Total hours flown (approx.) 4b. Years flying since solo:
not including Flight Engr.:
5. Flight Experience Breakdown by Aircraft Type/Model:
Using your log book as necessary, try to be as complete as possible on this question. Include your Civil (non-
commercial-private); Airline, and Military flight experience in this table following the sample given. Place a check
in the small box for those aircraft for which you hold a 'type' rating.
SAMPLE
Crew Position
• Aircraft
Type/Model Pilot Copilot Instr. Fit. Engr. Other
_' 707 c Hrs. .300 _ 8,._'d /,2. 0 0
a r"
m Dates 2-73 / ,5-7,7 "_'_8 / 3-7J . / _-g,6" / 4 t ,g_\ /
Z Check here _Check one for / ___ Insert total hrs. at top of box-- Xif 'type' c = civil /---From/To
rated a = airline
m = military
LM 26
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NASA.Ames Research Center Head-up Display
Test Pilot Questionnaire
5. Flight Experience Breakdown by Aircraft Type/Model: (continued)
Crew Position
Aircraft
Type/Model Pilot Copilot Instr. Fit. Engr. Other
c Hrs.
1. a
-"] m Dates / / / / /
c Hrs.
2. a
---1 m Dates / / / / /
c Hrs.
3. a
_[ m Dates / / / / /
c Hrs.
4. a
--_ m Dates / / / / /
c Hrs.
5. a
-7 m Dates / / / / /
c ttrs.
6. a
--1 m Dates / / / / /
c ttrs.
7. a
-"] m Dates / / / / /
c Hrs.
8. a
--] m Dates [ / / / /
c Hrs.
9. a
--] m Dates / / / / /
c Hrs.
10. a
-'7 m Dates / / / / /
c Hrs.
I1. a
"_] m Dates / / / / /
c Hrs.
12. a
"_ m Dates / / / / /
6a. Are you Cat. I1 rated? yes no (circle)
b. If"yes" specify type(s) of aircraft: (1) (2)
(3) (4)
7a. Are you Cat. 111qualified? yes no (circle)
b. lf"yes" specify type(s) of aircraft: (1) (2).
(3) (4)
8. Summary of Reduced Visibility Landing Experience:
Insert in each appropriate box the number of landings you havemade in the weather conditions noted in tile table
on following page.
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NASA-AmesResearchCenter Head-up Display
Test Pilot Questionnaire
8. Summaryof Reduced VisibilityLanding Experience: (continued)
Weather Condition
Cumulatively
within Category 1 Category 11
the past Manual Coupled Manual Coupled
DAY 6 months
TIME 12months
ONLY 2 years
NIGHT 6 months
TIME 12months
ONLY 2 years
9. Head-up Display Experience:
For purposes of this questionnaire, a head-up display is defined as a visualdisplay of flight information located in the
field of viewwhen looking outside through tile forward windshield. It may be "electro-mechanicalor cathode-
ray driven.
9a. ttave you ever flown an aircraft(s) that had a head-up display? yes no
b. If "yes" specify type of aircraft and approx, number of hours for each one in brackets:
(1) [ ] (2) [ ] (3) [ ]
c. If "yes" place an asterisk (*) in all those spaces of question9b. if the head-up display you used presented IFR informa-
tion suitable for makinga "landing" as opposed to weapons delivery type of display.
d. ttave you ever made instrument approaches usinga head-up display? yes no
e. lf"yes" specifyapproximate number of such approaches:
10. Whatis your professionalopinion of head-up displaysfor commercialaviation?
11. What is your professional opinion of tile autoland concept for commercial aviation?
12. Basedupon what you now know about head-up displays, list below the benefits (advantages) arid limitations
(disadvantages)which you think apply to its use in commercialaviation operations?
a. Benefits (advantages)
Most important:
Next most important:
Next most important:
Next most important:
Next most important:
Next most important:
(continue on opposite side if necessary)
2O
NASA-AmesResearchCenter Head-upDisplay
Test Pilot Questionnaire
12b. Limitations (disadvantages)
Mostimportant:
Next most important:
Next most important:
Next most important:
Next most important:
Next most important:
(continue on opposite side if necessary)
13. NarrativeDescriptionof the Most Extreme LandingConditionsyou haveever Encountered.
Pleasedescribe,using as much detail as you desire, the most extreme landingconditions (environmental, procedural
inside the cockpit, etc.) with regardto the followingbasiccategories: (continue on opposite side as necessary)
a. tteadwind:
b. Tailwind:
c. Wind Shear:
d. Other Unusual Weather (e.g., precipitation):
e. Nighttime Visual Illusions:
f. Daytime Visual Illusions:
g. Intermittent Visual Conditions (including unexpected visual range reductions):
h. Others:
Thank you for providing us with this useful information ]
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APPENDIX B
EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
HUD
FAA/NASA
PHASE2
STUDY4A
DAY NIGHT
RVR 1 RVR I I RVR I RVRCLEAR 2.400,I 1.600,I CLEARI a.400.I 1.600ft
-- I I°-
_1 _ I_-I-_-I ! IDH'=20b.I-!-I--I--'uJ I . ar_I " I I I h_"_-_-I, I I ! z IDH=_5oft
=i I I I I-ih-I I t I i zl,,,
=1,0N_• I • I olololololol • Iol • Iolololololol •
I ,o._ • I I III I I Iol I I Illl0 0 I o Iolol loll Iololot oll
1_1:0.25• I • IoIololololol• Iol • Iolololololol•D
>.,- _ _..._,o=,
_ °_n I- DH = 200 ft --_--' -- --,_ )H =200 ft
._ z I DR'= 150 ft I I DR'= 1E_0ft
_ ,o.E • I • olol "i o i • olol •
_o., -i oi i i .i ol I i
0.25 O i •-OIoI OI • i o oloI ,
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APPENDIX C
PILOT SUBJECT INSTRUCTIONS
(To be read by all pilots prior to testing)
The study you are about to participate in has been designed to measure various performances
associated with the head-down to head-up transitions during an approach procedure in different
weather conditions. The flight simulator you are going to fly is equivalent to a B-737 aircraft with
gross weight of 95,000 lb. Just before you begin each approach you should request the wind infor-
mation and runway visual range from the experimenter (acting as an air traffic controller). All
approaches will be straight in and will begin at an altitude of about 1,000 ft.
Your primary task will be to land the "aircraft" safely under the test conditions presented.
The following decision heights (DH) will apply: RVR = 2,400 ft, DH = 200 ft; RVR = 1,600 ft,
DH = 150 ft. These two weather conditions may also be referred to as Categories I and IIA, respec-
tively. Although we cannot tell you specifically what the wind conditions will be on every
approach, we can say that you will encounter various shears and turbulence. The correct procedures
to be followed by both test pilot subjects in this experiment are given next.
We have attempted to make this simulation fairly realistic in terms of the cockpit coordination
procedures you are to use. At the start of each approach trial (both pilots will have already adjusted
their seats to the correct position) the First Officer (F/O) will be looking out of the forward win-
dow in the anticipated direction of the runway (regardless of whether or not he can see it). His
chief task is to visually acquire the necessary ground cues and then call out "runway in sight,"
"approach lights in sight," or other appropriate words. (The pilots could use whatever words are
required by the airline they fly for.) At the instant the F/O sees these cues he is to depress the
square button located to his immediate left (located on the center console). It should be held down
for about 2 sec. The second task of the F/O is to read the checklist (one copy provided for each
pilot). This checklist reading may be done at any time desired after descending below 900 ft. The
captain may, at his own discretion, request altitude callouts in reduced visibility conditions.
All approaches will be manual for this experiment.
The Captain will remain head-down at all times until he hears the F/O say "runway in sight"
(or other appropriate words), at which time he (Captain) will then immediately look up to visually
acquire the required (visual) ground cues. When the point is reached where he has acquired enough
cues to decide whether to continue toward landing or to execute a missed approach, he (Captain)
will depress the button on the control yoke (pointed out by the experimenter). (This button press-
ing response should not be made at the initial call-0utby the F/O but only after the Captain has
perceived the necessary and sufficient external visual information required to make up his mind to
land or to go-around.) At the moment he pressesthis response button simultaneously he should say
that he has made his decision. He may merely repeat the words used by the F/O or may otherwise
indicate that enough cues are now present to make his decision. He need not indicate which deci-
sion he has made at this time. He (Captain) should continue to control the "aircraft" in accordance
with the decision he has just made.
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Both pilots are responsible for performing cross-checks that are deemed appropriate. Observed
disagreement in any instrument will be made known immediately. All voiced comments will be
tape-recorded for later analysis.
After each approach (trial) the experimenter in the simulator jump-seat will ask both pilots to
judge two things about that approach. These things are stated on the back side of the checklist sheet
along with the numerical rating scale that must be used. It is important that both pilots understand
the meaning of the questions asked (for each judgment) in the same way. More explicit information
will be given by the experimenter concerning these definitions, if requested by either pilot. Each
pilot will call out a whole number and a decimal for each of the two questions and the experimenter
will record the answers.
The following events will occur just prior to each approach trial:
1. Experimenter 1 (in jump seat) will verbally authorize start of testing on every approach.
2. Captain will call approach control for clearance and weather.
3. Captain will then have the authority to begin the approach (by depressing the illuminated
"operate" button on center console).
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APPENDIX D
SIMULATOR MOTION CHARACTERISTICS
Axis Displacement Acceleration Velocity
Roll -+9° 4.7 rad/sec 2 0.22 rad/sec
Frequency at 30°
phase lag = 0.5 Hz
Pitch +14° 4.7 rad/sec 2 0.22 rad/sec
_6 ° Frequency at 30°
phase lag = 0.5 Hz
Heave 24 in. -+1 g Frequency at 30.0
(vertical) (from ambient) phase lag = 0.5 Hz
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APPENDIX E
• APPROACH AND LANDING CHECKLIST
APPROACH AND LANDING CHECKLIST
Altimeter and instruments ...................... Set and X checked
Radio altimeter ..................................... MDA/DH
Speedbrake .................................. Armed (no lights)
Landing gear .............................. Down (2 green lights)
Flaps ................................... Check (angle call out)
Confirm runway in sight ................................. Roger
Optional for reduced visibility
Call out altitudes
(500 ft; 100 ft; at
minimum)
Modified from B737 operating manual.
26
APPENDIX F
PILOT SUBJECTIVE RATING SCALE
(From ref. 17)
"Controllability and precision of control of "Demands on the Pilot in terms of amount of
this approach?" skill, attention, or effort required."
SEMANTIC SCALE SEMANTIC SCALE
1- 1-
2 -- 2 --
.... Very easy to control, with good .... Completely undemanding (relaxed
precision and comfortable)
3- 3-
.... Largely (mostly) undemanding
4- 4-
.... Easy to control, with fair precision
5- 5-
.... Mildly demanding
6- 6-
.... Controllable, with inadequate
precision
7- 7-
.... Quite demanding
8- 8-
.... Marginally controllable .... Completely demanding
9- 9-
10 - - - - -Uncontrollable 10 -
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APPENDIX G
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE SUMMARY FOR THE CAPTAINS' DECISION TIME
Source df SS MS F p
Day-night (A) 1 77.14 77.14 1.81 ns
Wind shear (B) 1 37.68 37.68 1.69 ns
RVR ceiling (C) 8 809.22 101.15 4.15 <0.001
Subjects (D) 8 1231.7 153.96 a
(A) X (B) 1 7.50 7.50 .17 ns
(A) X (C) 8 118.75 14.84 .50 ns
(A) X (D) 8 340.37 42.54 a
(B) X (C) 8 288.66 36.08 1.05 ns
(B) X (D) 8 178.23 22.28 a
(C) × (D) 64 1558.54 24.35 a
(A) X (B) × (C) 8 469.32 58.67 2.24 <.05
(A) X (B) X (D) 8 353.72 44.21 a
(A) X (C) X (D) 64 1899.53 29.68 a
(B) X(C)X(D) 64 2192.10 34.25 a
(A) X (B) X (C) X (D) 64 1672.83 26.14 a
Mean 1 3772.00 3772.00 24.50
aCannot be tested because subject component is used as error term.
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APPENDIX H
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE SUMMARY FOR THE NUMBER OF TIMES THE
CAPTAIN LOOKED UP FROM THE INSTRUMENT PANEL DURING
FINAL APPROACH
Source df SS MS F p
Day-night (A) 1 13.4 13.4 0.84 ns
Wind shear (B) 1 245.4 245.4 14.20 <0.01
RVR ceiling (C) 8 2233.8 279.2 29.86 <0.001
Subjects (D) 8 1189.4 148.7 a
(A) × (B) 1 .11 .11 .01 ns
(A) X (C) 8 135.4 16.9 2.84 <0.01
(A) × (D) 8 127.4 15.9 a
(B) × (C) 8 91.6 11.4 1.43 ns
(B) X (D) 8 138.4 17.3 a
(C) X (D) 64 598.5 9.4 a
(A) × (B) X (C) 8 20.3 2.5 .83 ns
(A) × (B) × (D) 8 64.4 8.0 a
(A) X (C) X (D) 64 380.2 5.9 a
(B) × (C) X (O) 64 513.0 8.0 a
(A) × (B) × (C) X (D) 64 195.7 3.1 a
Mean 1 18586.8 18586.8 125.0
aCannot be tested because subject component is used as error term.
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